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Human tasks are often multidimensional. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) concluded
that “high-powered” incentives cannot work unless all dimensions of these tasks are ob-
servable in the ﬁrm. However, as this study shows, if the ﬁrm can observe the price vector
of its products in the market, distinguish each dimension of the price vector, and connect
the information with signals from workers in the ﬁrm, then the use of multidimensional
“high-powered” incentives becomes feasible. Product differentiation with committed qual-
ity satisﬁes those conditions, which has been practiced by the Japanese, but not by the
Western, manufacturing for a century.
Key words: multidimensional incentives, multitask incentives, high-powered incentives,
hedonic prices, Japanese manufacturing.
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A. “Low-powered” incentives in the Western manufacturing and theory
Stock prices are often thought to be good signals of executives’ performance, given that proﬁts
aretheir“products.”Then, thepriceofproductsseemstobesimilarlyusedas asignaltoevaluate
the performance of workers. This paper analyzes the conditions under which “high-powered”
incentives,1 connected with information about the product price, could be efﬁcient.
Many tasks are multidimensional especially where multiple dimensions of product quality
are critical. In that case it could be beneﬁcial to control relevant dimensions of workers’ task to
keep the optimal vector of quality.
However, a common style of business in the American manufacturing has been the mass
production of goods by unskilled workers. At this extreme, the beneﬁt from multidimensional
incentives is relatively small because the premium derived from better quality is small. On the
other hand, Europe has a tradition of manufacturing luxury goods by skilled workers. In this
case, a multidimensionalincentive becomes less manageable because it is harder to evaluate the
artistically high quality in separate and standardized terms. At both extremes, multidimensional
incentives for workers do not seem to work well. Production of standardized or luxury goods
with “low-powered” incentives for workers is an equilibrium in the Western manufacturing.
This ﬁts the argument forwarded by Ronald Coase and elaborated by Oliver Williamson.
Coase thought a ﬁrm replaces the price mechanism with a planned coordination of inputs to
avoid the cost of pricing.2 Here a ﬁrm is supposed to be intrinsically reluctant to price inputs, or
equivalently, provide incentives. Williamson represented this idea using a clear concept: “low-
powered” incentives are generally used in the ﬁrm while “high-powered” incentives, which
explicitly price inputs, exist in the market.3 They believed the main role of modern ﬁrms lies
in minimizing transaction costs rather than providing incentives with workers, and this views
coincided with practices in the Western manufacturing for the last one century.
B. Linking “hedonic prices” with incentives
However, as mentioned by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Rosen (1988), the centralized
pricing of tasks through a better-organized ﬂow of information within the ﬁrm could be more
efﬁcient than decentralized pricing in the market, if it is too costly to observe the market price
of each task because of jointed production, although the signals related to the performance of
each task are observable in the ﬁrm. This in-house pricing that composes the internal labor
market can be used for career concerns as long-term evaluation, combined with “low-powered”
incentives for short-term evaluation, as shown in Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975), and
formalized as the “career concerns” model by Holmstrom (1999) and Dewatripont, Jewitt and
1“High powered” incentives reﬂect a payment explicitly based on observed performance and “low-powered”
on a payment based on the opportunity cost of labor. Hence a “low-powered” incentive can be interpreted as a
compensation scheme that only satisﬁes the participation constraint. Williamson (1985), pp. 131-162.
2Coase (1937), p .391.
3Williamson (1985), pp. 131-162.
1Tirole (1999). But in theory the centralized pricing of tasks could also work for short-term
evaluation, i.e., provide “high-powered” incentives. If a ﬁrm can infer implicit relative prices
of each dimension of tasks evaluated in the market, then the ﬁrm can adjust its “high-powered”
incentiveas an in-housepricing to maximizeits proﬁt. Observed multidimensionalprices called
“hedonic prices” could thus be useful instruments to give “high-powered” incentives.
As Rosen (1974) pointed out, “hedonic prices” of differentiated products are more observ-
able than those of generic goods. But at the same time, the mystical value of luxuries might be
difﬁcult to decompose into several dimensions of a hedonic price. In contrast, hedonic prices
of differentiated goods consisting of several decomposable factors of quality in the middle-
range market seem easier to identify. Then it is feasible for ﬁrms in the middle range market to
connect the information about the hedonic prices of their products with the multidimensional
tasks required in production to provide explicit multidimensional, or, multitask “high-powered”
with workers and to optimally control their multidimensional efforts. Hence the production for
middle range market with the “high-powered” incentives for workers is another possible equi-
librium, with other equilibria of “low-powered incentives” with standardized or luxury goods
seen in the Western manufacturing.
The Japanese manufacturing linked hedonic prices to incentives and moved to this equi-
librium from the beginning of its modernization since the middle 1880s, and the earliest and
the most important example was the modernization of silk reeling from the middle 1880s to the
1900s.4 In theindustry,whichwas one ofthemostimportantdrivingforceof theJapanese econ-
omy due to its huge exports to the US before World War II, multidimensional wage schemes
had been developed by the early 1900s. Interestingly this was the time when ﬁrms tried to dif-
ferentiate their products by establishing their own brands in the New York market, which was
the largest in the world. While the quality of raw silk consisted of various aspects, Japanese
manufacturers focused on only a few critical and well-observed dimensions of quality, commit-
ted to them under their brand names, and provided workers with incentives to focus on these
dimensions of quality. Japanese raw silk acquired a vast share in the US market, although the
high-end of the market was continuouslyheld by Italian raw silk, and the low-end was occupied
by Chinese.
C. Multiple signals of multiple tasks
This study is motivated by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). An insight of them was in their
focus on the optimization of the “direction” of vector-valued effort rather than just its “scalar.”5
Most work done by human beings are multidimensional while work done by engines are mea-
sured by a single scalar, such as horse-power or torque. For instance, individual workers often
have to perform along at least two dimensions: increasing productivityand retaining quality. As
easily imagined, it is more difﬁcult to make individuals work both fast and carefully, rather than
4The silk reeling industry is an industry that produces raw silk threads from cocoons. Raw silk is used as
a material for luxury clothes. For descriptive research on the silk reeling industry of Japan, see Nakabayashi
(2003, forthcoming).
5Hence, a “direction” mentions exactly the “direction” of a vector in
Rm where m ≥ 2, rather than just + or
− in
R.
2just work fast or just carefully. Indeed the result of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) emphasizes
it is difﬁcult for multidimensional “high-powered” incentives to work in a ﬁrm.
However, as implied by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), it could become easier to use if
some signals of each dimension of effort vector become observable by the ﬁrm. One important
signal that the ﬁrm could observe is the price vector of its products; the hedonic price. As
shown later, implementing “high-powered” incentives become feasible if the ﬁrm can observe
the hedonic price of its products. Intuitively, The more signals, the better it is for the ﬁrm
to provide incentives, and this intuition is easily evoked by the “sufﬁcient statistic” result in
Holmstrom (1979). To be utilized for multidimensional incentives, however, multiple signals
have to satisfy another condition: each dimension of each signal must be distinguishable to the
principal. We can summarize main features of the conditions for multidimensional incentives
to work on the models in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and in this study as follows:
Multidimensional incentives based on one signal (Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991))
Each dimension of the vector-valued signal must be observable, but each dimension of
the error vector of the vector-valued signal can be dependent to each other.
Multidimensional incentives based on more than one signals (this study)
Some dimensions of some vector-valued signals can be unobservable, but each dimension
of the error vector of all vector-valued signals must be independent to each other.
While those conditions will be analyzed in detail in the next section, predictions from this
study are:
If a ﬁrm knows the multidimensional price vector of its products in the market,
distinguishes each dimension of the price vector, and establishes a production or-
ganization where the information is preserved and utilized to control production,
then the ﬁrm can optimize the effort vectors of its workers by introduction of multi-
dimensional incentives.
Hence, this study inquires conditions under which the constraints on multidimensional
“high-powered” incentives are relaxed in a sense, but are strengthened in another sense. If a
ﬁrm can observe the price vector of its products, the dependance on the signal in the ﬁrm could
be reduced. However, for the price vector to be useful information to give incentives, it is nec-
essary that each dimension of the price vector can be distinguished. This condition seems to
be satisﬁed in the middle range market of the products, but neither in the low-end nor in the
high-end market.
After Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) presented their theoretical prediction about the dif-
ﬁculty of applying multidimensional incentives within a ﬁrm, the conditions under which their
use becomes feasible have never been considered.6 This research tries to close this gap in the
literature.
6An empirical study by Margaret Slade, which applies the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) model, showed
how their model exactly ﬁts transactions in the market, not within a ﬁrm, of the Western world (Slade (1996)).
In the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) model, the risk aversion of the agent plays a critical role, and so another
theoretical prediction by them was that multidimensional/multitaskincentives could be optimal for executiveswho
bear more risk than employees, which was considered by Feltham and Xie (1994) and Preyra and Pink (2001).
3In the section II, some theoretical predictions are deduced from the model under hedonic
prices. While Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) analyzed the function of incentives within an
organization, thispaper is also interested in thestream ofinformationthat ﬂows from themarket
into an organization. Inquired ﬁrst will be the condition where more than two signals can be
utilized to provide incentives, considered then will be a case where two signals – observed
performance in the ﬁrm and observed price vector of the products in the market – are utilized.
Section III estimates the compensation scheme in a silk reeling factory, and depicts its
changes from the 1890s to 1910s. It will be shown that a 4-dimensional wage scheme was built
in the early 1900s when the ﬁrm established its own brand name to differentiate its products.
Section IV evaluates how each dimension of the workers’ effort was optimized.
Section V sums up the results and discusses further related topics.
II. Theoretical predictions
A. The standard model of multidimensional incentives
The model from Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) is ﬁrst outlined here. Consider a multidimen-
sional task. An agent has a particular amount of attention as her/his endowment, and allots
her/his attention to each dimension, which composes an effort vector tT = (t1,t2,...,tm).
Suppose that there are two dimensions t1 and t2 in the task, and that the principal observes
signals x1 and x2 of t1 and t2, and relates these signals to the wage. If the two dimensions
are substitutes and one of them is unobservable, then the agent tries to get a higher wage by
increasing her/his effort for the observable one and decreasing effort for the unobservable one.
In this case, it is necessary to use “low-powered” instead of “high-powered” incentives in order
to have workers pay attention to both of t1 and t2. We can summarize the discussion on “low-
powered” incentives in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) as follows: Suppose that inputs to each
dimension of the task are substitutes. Then, unless every dimension of the task is sufﬁciently
observable, multidimensional “high-powered” incentives are generally difﬁcult to apply, and
“low-powered” incentives are more efﬁcient.7
B. Hedonic prices in the market and multidimensional tasks in the ﬁrm
Since Waugh (1928) and Court (1939), the quality of products has been thought to be intrinsi-
cally multidimensional.8 Suppose that consumers in the market have a multidimensional utility
function that is concave with respect to every term of the product quality, and they assign an
l-list of quality magnitude (q1,q2...,ql) to amount Q of a product they purchase; i.e., suppose
that the market has a hedonic price function p(q′). Hence, the hedonic price p(q′) is a mapping
from a vector q′, whose coordinates specify the quality magnitude of the product to a speciﬁc
amount of money p. By marginally changing the relevant quality qi, where i = 1,...,l, the ﬁrm
7Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), pp. 34-35.
8Also see Court (1941a,1941b),Griliches (1961),Lancaster (1966), Baumol (1967),Rosen (1974), and Epple
(1987).
4accordingly observes marginal changes of price, thus can approximate the shape of hedonic
price function p(q′) in the neighborhood of the amount Q of the product.
Then, the ﬁrm can infer the (l + 1)-dimensional price vector of the product p(q)T =
p(p1(q1),...,pl(ql),pl+1(ql+1)), where ql+1 speciﬁes the quantity, i.e., ql+1 = Q.
C. The model of multidimensional incentives with multiple signals
Now consider a case where a risk-neutral principal utilizes n signals of a risk-averse agent’s
effort vector t. Put m = l+1, which is the number of dimension of the price vector of product,
and suppose,
t ≫ 0: k-dimensional effort vector generated by the agent.
C(t): private cost function of the agent, which is strictly convex.




+ where j = 1,...,n: m-dimensional outcome realized by the k-dimensional
effort vector t.
xj(t) =  j(t) + ǫj: m-dimensional signal vector of m-dimensional outcome vector  j(t),
observed by the principal. ǫj stands for the measurement error vector of the outcome
vector  j. ǫ1,...,ǫn are independently distributed with ǫj ∼ N(0,Σj).
u(w − C(t)) = −e−r[w−C(t)]: Constant Absolute Risk-Averse utility function of the agent.9
α: m-dimensional incentive vector.
β: transfer of total surplus for allocation.
Suppose k = m, and the i-th coordinate of  j, µji, is a one-to-one mapping of the i-th
coordinate ti of t. Then the principal can use the signal xj, j = 1,...,n, to construct the
compensationscheme, which extendsthemodelofHolmstromand Milgrom(1991)formultiple
signals, such that
(1) w = α
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where Γj is a k × k matrix. Then,












so that the agent’s Certainty Equivalent is
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Then the contract (t,α,β,Γj), j = 1,...,n, must solve
(2) max
Γj, α










α, j = 1,...,n,










+ β − C(t
′). (IC)
The principal must choose the optimal weight of signals Γ ∗
j such that the variance of wage
αT [
 n
h=1ΓhΣhΓh]α is minimized. Here we have to note there exists a condition to be satis-
ﬁed by each covariance matrix Σj, for the uniqueness of this problem’s solution.
Proposition 1.
For j = 1,...,n, suppose that each dimension of the measurement error ǫj of the signal xj is
nonzero so that the variance of each dimension of ǫj is positive. Then, the optimal contract
which solves (2) is unique only if all dimensions of ǫj are independent from each other, so that
the covariance matrix Σj of ǫj is diagonal.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 says each dimension of the signals must be clearly distinguishablefrom other
dimensions by the principal. If some dimensions of ǫj are not independent, then the signal xj
cannot be utilized as a signal of the same dimensions of the effort vector t with other signals
x1,...,xj−1,xj+1,...,xn in the compensation scheme (1). If the principal nevertheless wants to
use such xj, he should use it as a signal of another aspect of the agent’s effort.
Therefore, if the principal wants to use multiplesignals by the procedure shown above, each
dimension of any signal must be distinguishable from each other, i.e., respective elements of
the signals must be easy to ﬁnd. If the ﬁrm, for instance, wants to use the hedonic price of its
products, each factor of the product quality must be observed by consumers easily, so that each
dimension of the product’s hedonic price is separately observed by the ﬁrm. In other word,
the hedonic price cannot be used as a signal if the composition of the quality product is very
complicated so that respective factor of the quality is not well distinguishable to consumers, as
happens for very luxury goods.
6Focusing on the situation where multiple signals are used by the ﬁrm, suppose for the re-
minder of this paper that each dimension of the measurement error ǫj is independent to each
other so that Σj is diagonal, hence suppose that optimal Γj is a diagonal matrix whose diagonal
entries are γj ii, for j = 1,...,n and i = 1,...k. Also suppose that 0 < γj ii,
 n
h=1γh ii = 1, for
j = 1,...,n, i = 1,...,k, and normalize outcomes such that  1(t) =  2(t) =,...,=  n(t) = t.
Then, since
 n
h=1 Γh = I, (2) and (3) are reduced to
(4) max
Γj, α
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The ﬁrst order condition of (4) with respect to Γj is











which minimizes the risk to the risk-averse agent, i.e., the variance of wage. 10

















Combining (7) with (8) gives
10Put σ2
j,ii,j = 1,...,n,i = 1,...,k, as the diagonal entry on the i-th row of the covariance matrix Σj of the
error vector ǫj of signal xj. Then, the row vector (γ1,ii,...,γj,ii,...,γn,ii) consisting of diagonal entries on i-th



























































j whose diagonal entries are γ∗
j,11,...,γ∗






























The following is a description of this procedure by the principal: The principal
1. observes the signals xj(t), for j = 1,2,...,n,
2. assigns the information weight matrix Γj to xj(t), such that the variance of the compen-
sation, which is the risk to the agent, is minimized,
3. and then chooses an incentive vector α such that the total surplus should be maximized.
Now suppose n = 2, that is, suppose that the ﬁrm uses two signals of the effort vector
t of the agent; the quality and quantity of the product generated in the ﬁrm  1(t) ≡  (t),
and the price vector of the product in the market  2(t) ≡ p(t). Let x(t) =  (t) + ǫ be the
performance of the worker observed with some noise in the ﬁrm, and let ˜ p(t) = p(t) + ε be
the observed price vector with some noise in the market. The compensation scheme is given
by w = αT [Γµx(t) + Γp˜ p(t)] + β. Normalize  (t) and p(t) such that  (t) = p(t) = t. In


























where t1 and t2 respectively stand for the quality and the quantity of the product.



































































An interpretation of the result can be summarized as Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 be-
low.
Proposition 2.
(a) If any dimension of the performance vector  (t) of workers in the ﬁrm or the price vector
p(t) of the product in the market is neither perfectly unobservable, nor perfectly observable
(i.e., 0 < σ2
i < +∞ and 0 < ς2
i < +∞, for i = 1,2), then it is optimal to use informationabout
both  (t) and p(t) for each dimension of the effort vector t in order to provide an incentive.
(b) For the i-th dimension of t, if  (t) or p(t) becomes perfectly unobservable (σ2
i → +∞
or ς2
i → +∞), then it is optimal to ignore the signal from the unobservable one and use
information only about the observable one to provide an incentive. For the i-th dimension of
t, if  (t) or p(t) becomes perfectly observable (σ2
i → 0 or ς2
i → 0), then it is optimal to use
information only about the perfectly observable one.
8Proof. See the Appendix.
Consider the conditional joint distribution for a given effort ti, fx(xi|ti)f˜ p(˜ pi|xi,ti) =
f(xi, ˜ pi|ti). Suppose 0 < σ2
i < +∞, and let th
i and tl
i denote high and low achievement of
dimension i of t, respectively. Then the likelihood ratio f(xi, ˜ pi|th
i )/f(xi, ˜ pi|tl
i) depends on ˜ pi
if and only if 0 < ς2
i < +∞. Hence Proposition 2 shows that the “sufﬁcient statistic” result of
Holmstrom (1979) holds for this mechanism.
Proposition 3.
Suppose 0 < σ2
i < +∞ and 0 < ς2
i < +∞.
(a)If the i-th dimension of the performance vector  (t) in the ﬁrm or the price vector p(t) in the
market becomes less observable (σ2
i or ς2
i increases), then it is optimal to weaken the incentive
for that dimension.
(b) If the both of two signals of a dimension become less/more observable, then the ratio of
marginal decreases/increases of incentive on the dimension due to the marginally increas-
ing/decreasing noises of the signals must depend on the reverse of the ratio of noises of the
signals.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As Proposition 3 indicates, when the i-th dimension of  (t) becomes less observable, the
ﬁrm can keep must re-weight i-th dimension of p(t) by adjusting γii accordingly, and can
keep the incentive α instead of giving up the whole incentive. Also, the adjustment to the
increased noise of a signal must depend on the noisiness of the other signal. This shows that
the conditions for the multidimensional “high-powered” incentive to work can be relaxed if the
ﬁrm uses information about p(t) as well as  (t).
In business practice, this point could be important. A wage scheme depending only on a
signal is naturally sensitive to the noise of signal, so that the risk might be too large to be bur-
dened by the agent. This is often an important reason to give up the “high-powered” incentives.
Adjustment among signals and reduction of risk solve this problem to some extent.
As shown by Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), as long as the ﬁrm uses only information
within the organization, the conditions for the multidimensional “high-powered” incentives to
work are strict. However, if each dimension of the price vector p(t) is observed and distin-
guishable from each other as Proposition 1 requires, and if the ﬁrm can preserve the stream of
information about the price vector, then a multidimensional incentive becomes easier to use, as
Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 indicate.
Related to this point, another remark is also necessary.
Remark.
Since p(t) shows the aggregate performance of all workers of the ﬁrm while x(t) is individu-
allygenerated, informationaboutp(t) can beutilizedto providean incentiveonlyfor aggregate
performance, not for individual ones.
Now that the beneﬁt from the market-oriented multidimensional incentives looks rather
9straightforward, the next question is under what conditions the price vector can be observed and
each dimension of it can be distinguishable by the ﬁrm. The best-case scenario is a monopoly,
where the ﬁrm can easily observe the change of each coordinate of p(t) by increasing each
coordinate of q(t), without any noise from the pricing of other sellers’ products. The worst-
case scenario is that a ﬁrm just sells a generic product at the same price as other sellers in the
market do, where the ﬁrm is never able to observe a price increase from their efforts to enhance
a dimension of quality.
However, if information about quality of a product is not perfectly observed by buyers at
the time when they buy it in the market, then some ﬁrms will try to establish their own brands
that guarantee some quality in order to differentiate its product and receive a quality premium
from buyers.11 Consider the establishment of a brand a little more carefully. In practice, there
are two kinds of brands. One is a brand of luxury goods such as the European fashion brands.
The quality of these products is hard to evaluate at the time of purchase, so consumers choose a
product by relying on the established image of its brand. The other type is typically a brand of
electric appliances or automobiles for the middle-range market. The quality of these products
can be seen in catalogues or as samples, and ﬁrms whose catalogue specs and samples are
credible ﬁnd it optimal to establish their brands to reﬂect this. The quality of Japanese electric
appliances and cars can be seen in catalogues and as samples at shops, and their catalogues
and samples are believed to almost exactly show the real quality of these products so that the
reputation of their brands are kept.
The condition of Proposition 1 might not be satisﬁed in the ﬁrst type of brands; luxury
brands. However, the second type of brands of differentiated products in the middle-range
market could satisfy the condition of Proposition 1. Hence, if the second type of brand is
established, then the price vector is observable to the supplier when consumers differentiate the
multidimensional quality of the product and then buy it. Even if the market for such brands is
competitiveamong suppliers that have established their brands so that suppliers are price takers,
each supplier can observe the price vector of her/his products.
Then the ﬁrm may try to use the information about the price vector of its brand to control
incentives within its production organizations, which indeed happened in the Japanese manu-
facturing a century ago. Before studying the details, let’s summarize the theoretical predictions.
Prediction 1.
If a ﬁrm can observe the price vector of its products by differentiating them through the estab-
lishment of a brand name, and if the ﬁrm can construct a production organization where the
information is preserved and utilized to control production, then the ﬁrm can introduce multidi-
mensional incentives and optimize the effort vector of workers (Proposition 1 and Proposition
2).
Prediction 2.
If a ﬁrm can observe the price vector by establishing its brand so that it can use the information
about the price vector as well as the outcome observed in the ﬁrm to provide incentives, then
11Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), p. 306. Klein and Lefﬂer (1981).
10these incentives will be given for the aggregate performance of all workers as well as individual
performance, since the price vector is a signal of aggregate performance (Remark).
Prediction 3.
Consider a product whose brand is established in the market. If the relative observability of a
dimension of quality changes in the market, then the multidimensional incentive must change
accordingly (Proposition 3).
III. The wage scheme in early 20th century Japan
A. Establishment of the brand
The modern silk reeling industry in Japan grew in the middle 1880s and increased exports to
the U.S. dramatically. The Japanese share of the U.S. market had reached 50 percent by the end
of the 1880s, 70 percent by 1910, and 80 percent in the 1920s, overwhelming both the Italian
and the Chinese silk reeling industries. This was the ﬁrst case where a competitive export
industry led Japan’s economic development, which has been repeated by various manufacturing
industries since then.12
When raw silk was traded in the market, it was priced according to several factors of quality.
However, it had been almost impossible for silk reeling manufacturers to acquire information
about this price vector in the New York market until the early 1880s. Prior to the 1880s, the
Western trading companies put their trademarks, or “private chops,” on the raw silk after they
inspected and re-packed it, beforeexportingit to Europeand theU.S. Thus, thequalitypremium
and the information about the price belonged to the Western trading companies that owned the
“private chops.”
In the middle 1880s, however, leading manufacturers organized cooperatives for joint in-
spection and shipment, and they put their trademarks, or “original chops,”13 on their products.
The New York raw silk market was a spot market where raw silk was traded by sample. Thus
the establishment of a brand meant that its samples were recognized as credible, and the pro-
ducer of the brand was able to observe the price vector of her/his products. By establishing
producers’ brands, the quality premium and the information about price thus came to belong to
those manufacturers’ cooperatives, not to Western trading companies. It meant, however, that
the most important information about the price and effort vectors was still unknown to each
member manufacturer of a cooperative. Only the cooperatives’ headquarters, which conducted
the joint inspection of products, recorded the performance of workers, and guaranteed the qual-
ity of the brands to the market, possessed the information necessary to evaluatethe performance
of workers.
Hence, major manufacturers withdrew from cooperatives, built large factories that included
inspection processes from the late 1890s to the early 1900s, and established their own brands.
This allowed respective silk reeling manufacturers to ﬁnally grasp the stream of information
12Nakabayashi (2003), pp. 1-59.
13Trademarks of trading companies were called “private chops” and those of silk reeling manufacturers were
called “original chops.” Duran (1913), pp. 105-106.
11aboutthepricevectorinthemarket. Thenmultidimensionalincentiveswereintroducedbythose
manufacturers. Usually, Labor productivity, Material productivity,14 Evenness of threads15 and
Luster of threads of raw silk were monitored to provide incentives.
B. Determination of the wage
Now let us inquire about the real process of optimizing the effort vector. One example here is
that of the Kasahara Factory, in Suwa County, Nagano Prefecture, which was the central district
oftheindustryinJapan. In thesilkreelingindustryin SuwaCounty, all workers were youngand
female, all ofthemlivedin dormitoriesoftheﬁrms theyworked for, and alltheirlivingexpenses
were paid by the ﬁrms. They were not unionized in the relevant period, so that obstacles to the
introduction of new management practices were small. Employment contracts were usually
one-year and turnover rate in a factory between two consecutive years was generally high.16
Also the technology of reeling raw silk did not require workers to literally cooperate. In general
wages were determined by the ex post relative evaluation by which the effects of common
exogenous shocks were excluded; hence the incentives of risk-averse workers were enhanced.17
Workers received by lump-sum payments at the end of year, in addition to the livingexpenses.18
The Kasahara Factory followed these common practices.
Until the early 1900s, the Kasahara Factory had belonged to a cooperative for joint inspec-
tion and shipment under the cooperative’s brand. Those days, only Labor productivity and
Material productivity had been systematically recorded in the Kasahara Factory to determine
wages, not dimensions related to the quality of the products. Raw silk that did not satisfy a spe-
ciﬁc level of quality was excluded from shipment, but the results of inspections were not used
for determining wages. The Kasahara Factory stopped cooperative inspections and shipments
at the end of 1903, and began to inspect raw silk independently and ship it under its own brand
in 1904.
Since 1904, in order to determine wages, 1) Labor productivity, 2) Material productivity,
3) Evenness of threads, and 4) Luster of threads were systematically recorded at the Kasahara
Factory, where Luster and Evenness were critical dimensions of quality. These dimensions
were recorded forall produced raw silkeveryday duringtheinspectionprocess before shipment.
During the year under the contracts, workers’ performances were recorded every day, relative
performances were calculated every half month, and workers’ efforts followed the overseers’
guidance based on the recent half-month performance. 19 Then wages were paid at lump sum
according to the relativeperformance of each worker at the end of the year. This practice spread
throughout Suwa County in the 1900s, a case of which was the Kasahara Factory.
14Material productivity was the amount of a product over a unit of material (cocoon), which revealed the
performance of economizing on the raw material: cocoons.
15Evenness of threads was the most importantfactor of quality in the U.S. market, where power looms for mass
production prevailed.
16Thus the career concerns were not relevant.
17Holmstrom (1982a).
18Hunter (2003), pp. 144-189. Nakabayashi (2003), pp. 241-255.
19Therefore the practice satisﬁed the condition in which a linear compensation scheme can be assumed (Holm-
strom and Milgrom (1987), pp. 316-322 ).
12Table 1 shows the wage distribution that does not include the living expense paid by the
ﬁrm. Large variance in the table indicates a feature of the “high-powered” incentive of this
wage system.
C. Construction of the wage scheme
In the Kasahara Factory, the wage scheme had been two dimensional until the early 1900s, as
shown in Table 2. 20
Scheme 1897
w: wage. x1: Labor productivity. x2: Material productivity.
(11) w = α1x1 + α2x2 + β, α1,α2 > 0.
However, since 1904, the wage scheme has had four dimensions as follows:
Scheme 1904
w: wage. x1: Labor productivity. x2: Material productivity. x3: Evenness of threads. x4:
Luster of threads.
(12) w = α1x1 + α2x2 + α3x3 + α4x4 + β, α1,α2,α3,α4 > 0.
The regressions of (12) are in Table 2. In 1904, the Kasahara Factory incorporated an in-
spection process into its own factory and began to sell its raw silk under its own brand. With this
organizational change, the Kasahara Factory could acquire the signal x(t) of the effort vector t
that included quality dimensions, and recorded it in the daily inspections. Furthermore, it was
20The coefﬁcients α3 and α4 of x3 and x4 are unstable in some years on Table 2. It is supposedly from two
reasons. One is that t3: Evenness of threads and t4: Luster of threads, both of which were for cleaner threads,
presumably interacted with each other. Indeed, the coefﬁcient of the interaction term of a standardized regression
through the origin with year dummies Y19XX is signiﬁcant as follows:
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p value for F : 0.000. The number of samples: 2,235.
The other reason was a discrepancy between ex ante incentive and ex post performance. If all of workers
were on the path of incentive mechanism and performed exactly as guided, then their performance should have
concentrated on the optimal point so that their performance should be the same, hence a regression of observed
ex post differences of their performance to the wage should not have ﬁt. For instance, the sign of α4 in 1910 is
opposite in Table 2, but it was not because workers did not follow the incentivefor t4, rather because they followed
it very well as shown on Table 3-c (discussed in the next section).
The wage scheme in Table 1 estimates the ﬁnal result of calculating a wage. The actual practice leading to the
result was a little more complicated. See Nakabayashi (2003), pp. 256-268.
13able to acquire information about the price vector ˜ p(t) of its own products, i.e., another signal
of t. Prediction 1 suggests at this point the Kasahara Factory could introduce an explicitly
multidimensional “high-powered” incentive scheme, and it was exactly what happened.
The aggregateperformance, giventhepricein the market, can be approximatedby thereturn
on sales, i.e., proﬁts over sales. Indeed a regression of the real wage to the return on sales
through 1904-1913 shows a signiﬁcant relation.21 This indicates wages, at least to some degree,
depended on the overall performance of the ﬁrm. In other words, that portion of the wage was
determined as a reward for the aggregate performance of the whole factory, a result Prediction
2 suggests.
Since it was not necessary for workers to literally cooperate, a reward for aggregate per-
formance was just for aggregated effort, not cooperative activity. However, a contemporary
observer in a local newspaper pointed out that rewards for aggregate performance were also
useful to keep up workers’ morale.22
Next, we will check whether the effort vector was really optimized during the process.
IV. Optimization of the effort vector
A. Substitute dimensions
In the silk reeling industry, Material productivity t2, Evenness of threads t3, and Luster of
threads t4, all of which needed careful processing, were obviously substitutes for Labor pro-
ductivityt1. Iftherelativepriceoflaborand materialchanges, and/ortherelative“price” ofeach
dimension of the quality changes, the effort vector that maximizes proﬁts changes accordingly.
B. Controlling the direction of the effort vector












Neither Material productivity t2, Evenness of threads t3, nor Luster of threads t4 needed to
be enhanced inﬁnitely. Rather, given the relative price to clear the product market, the labor
market, and the raw material market, optimal levels of the quality of product and the material
productivity were decided such that proﬁt was maximized.
21A standardized regression is as follows:
RW: real wage. ROS: return on sales of the Kasahara Factory.
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p value for F : 0.000. The sample numbers:2,235.
The sign of x2 is negativeprobablybecause x2 heavily dependedon the quality of material cocoon,which changed
due to the weather of each year, so that the coefﬁcient of pooled data of x2 for multiple years do not necessarily
depend on the performance of workers. It is indicated by that the coefﬁcient is signiﬁcantly positive with year
dummies in the note 25.
22Haizanbo, “Kawagishimurano ichinich (5)” (One day in the Kawagishi Village (5)), ShinanoMainichi Shim-
bun (Shinano daily), Nagano, July 28, 1903.
14Therefore, if workers’ ability was sufﬁciently high, their attention had to be allotted to each
ofMaterialproductivityt2, Evenness ofthreads t3, and Lusterof threadst4 such that theoptimal
levels of them were satisﬁed, and the rest amount of workers’ attention, if they had, had to be
allotted to Labor productivity t1, at the optimum. However, if some workers’ ability was not
sufﬁcient so that their attention was not enough to satisfy the optimal levels of the t2, t3, and t4,
the ﬁrm had to instruct them to enhance all of the t1, t2, t3, and t4.
Thus, according to the distribution of ability of workers, the ﬁrm was supposed to instruct
less able workers to enhance all dimensions t1, t2, t3, and t4 with some weights, and instruct
abler workers to ﬁx dimensions t2, t3, and t4 at the optimal level and to enhance t1.
Hence, on the (t1,ti) plane (i = 2,3,4), plots of performance (t1,ti) of workers were
supposed to follow an increasing and bounded-above function g(t1) if the effort vector t was
optimized. Then, the image of the signal x(t) on the (x1,xi) plane (i = 2,3,4) was also
supposed to converge an increasing and bounded-above function according to the optimization
of the effort vector t.
Motivated by a Gaussian kernel regression of Labor productivity x1 and Material produc-
tivity x2 (Figure 1), we take a ﬁrst approximation of such a function with
(13) xi = η1/x1 + η2, 0 < x1;η1 < 0;i = 2,3,4.
C. The optimized effort vector and information from the market
The image of x(t) on the Labor productivity x1- Material productivity x2 plane had not been
optimized at all in 1897 or 1901 (Table 3-a), even though Material productivity x2 had been
recorded (Table 2). The inspection process had been carried out by the headquarters of the
cooperative before 1904, not the Kasahara Factory, so that even information about Material
productivity had probably not been handed to Kasahara on a daily basis. Hence the Kasahara
Factory could neither monitor nor instruct the effort vector t of workers on daily basis. Conse-
quently, workers increased Labor productivity x1 by decreasing Material productivity x2 below
the optimal level. It was optimized after 1904 (Table 3-a).
The process of optimization can also be seen on the Labor productivity x1 - Evenness of
threads x3 plane since 1904 (Table 3-b).
For Labor productivity t1, Material productivityt2, and Evenness of threads t3, the effort
vector t has been well controlled since 1904, when the Kasahara Factory started independent
inspection and made its original brand. On the other hand, the image of t on the Labor produc-
tivity t1 - Luster of threads t4 plane was optimized as late as 1908 (Table 3-c).
Interestingly, some changes occurred in the US market at the beginning of the 1908 season.
The Silk Association of America, the industrial body consisting of silk manufacturers and mer-
chants, suggested a method of classiﬁcation for Japanese brands of raw silk, using a standard
brand as a measure. Using thisstandardized measure allowedbuyers to more easily differentiate
the quality of raw silk sold by different brands.23 At the same time it enabled manufacturers to
better observe the price vector from the purchasing behavior of buyers in the New York market.
23“Classiﬁcations of raw silks,” The American Silk Journal, New York, vol.27, no.7, 1908, p. 23.
15Indeed, Luster of threads became more effective for the determination of wages in 1908-1913
than it had been in 1904-1907. 24
As Prediction 3 claims, faced with a changing market, the ﬁrm observed the Luster dimen-
sion ˜ p4 of ˜ p(t) more clearly, and enhanced the incentive α4 for dimension x4 of the observed
performance x(t), both of which were signals of t4 of the effort vector t. Then, the image of
x(t) on the (x1,x4) plane converged to the optimal curve (Table 3-c, Figure 2), which reﬂects
the optimization of t on the (t1,t4) plane.
Theincentiveschemeworkedonthebasisofinformationfromtheproductmarket, aswellas
information in the ﬁrm, as Prediction 1 mentions. Moral hazard by workers had been a serious
problem until the early 1900s, but after 1904 this problem had been almost completely solved.
After 1904, the Kasahara Factory established its own brand as an instrument to capture the
stream of information about the price vector of its products, utilized it to control the incentives
of workers, and explicitly optimized the multidimensional effort vector of workers.
V. Discussion: a viewpoint of comparative analysis
A. A tradition of multidimensional incentives
As predicted by the model, the establishment of a brand that enabled ﬁrms to observe the price
vectors of their products made the introduction of “high-powered” multidimensional incentives
for workers possible.
In the Japanese silk reeling industry, manufacturers established their own brands to acquire
quality premiums that had belonged to trading companies. The establishment of brands accom-
panied the construction of an organization to inspect the quality. Within this organization, the
multidimensional performance of workers had begun to be monitored and recorded. As a result
of these organizational changes, silk reeling manufacturers acquired informationabout the price
vector in the market and about performance of their workers in their factories on a daily basis.
By taking advantage of this condition, they were able to optimize the effort vectors of workers
by connecting information about the price vector with that of the effort vector. The informa-
tion stream of the price vector from the product market was efﬁciently utilized for controlling
incentives in the ﬁrm.
24Standardized regressions through the origin with year dummies Y19XX are below.
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p value for F : 0.000. The number of samples: 768.
w1908-1913





























p value for F : 0.000. The number of samples: 1,467.
The coefﬁcient of x4 was more signiﬁcant in 1908-1913.
16B. Segmented quality of Japanese cars
This parable of a historical experiment contains some implication to understand the contempo-
rary difference between the Japanese and the Western manufacturing.
For two decades, Japanese cars have had a good reputation because of their quality, and, in
2006, Consumer Reports25 ﬁnally ranked “Japanese models as its top choice in all 10 vehicle
categories.” However, what is this good quality? The annual car-buying guide of Consumer
Reports “is based on tests of more than 200 models, covering performance, comfort, safety and
fuel economy, among other factors.”26 Thus the kind of market reports usually evaluates cars
along several categories, such as engine troubles within a few years after purchase, or driversat-
isfaction in handling, and so forth. Then those reports classify cars by summing up the points
given to respective categories or terms. Therefore, they implicitly assume that consumers’ eval-
uations, or utility functions, are additively separable across standardized categories. In other
words, the fact that Japanese cars achieve high quality ratings means the additively separable
dimension of their quality components are high. Japanese car manufacturers likely optimize
the quality components of their cars subject to the multidimensional price that reﬂect the addi-
tively separable and standardized beneﬁts their customers receive from the quality. On the other
hand, the beneﬁts of owning a Corvette or Porsche seem to be hard to separate and calculate in
their separated components, and in such a high-end market, Japanese cars have been relatively
unsuccessful. Therefore the Japanese auto industry is typically good at hedonic approaches to
quality control in the middle range market, as the Japanese silk reeling industry was a century
ago. This is exactly a point directly related to Prediction 1. The Japanese manufacturing has
focused on the middle range of the market, where each dimension of the quality can be easily
distinguished from the others, as Prediction 1 requires.
Another particular feature of the Japanese manufacturing is that multidimensional evalua-
tions for wage and promotion schemes are imposed on blue-collar workers as well as white-
collar workers to keep product quality high.27 Combined with career concerns, these compen-
sation schemes consist of multidimensional incentives.
Given those casual observations with the analysis of this research, the multidimensional
“high-powered”incentiveson shopﬂoors seemtoworkbetter, ifthequalitycontrolisconducted
in well-deﬁned multidimensional terms.
That story also induces us to return to the understanding of the “borders of ﬁrms” implied
by Alchian and Demsetz (1972). A ﬁrm tries to exclude intermediary players and incorporate
transactions if it can acquire a quality premium with smaller transaction costs. At the same
time, the ﬁrm can increase total surplus if it can preserve the information stream from the
product market to optimize the effort vectors of workers in the production organization. Hence,
the borders of the ﬁrm can also be decided by the beneﬁts from quality and incentive controls,
as well as the transaction cost, as seen in the Japanese manufacturing more than one century
ago.
25Consumer Reports New Car Buying Guide 2006, Consumer Reports Books, June 12, 2006.
26Financial Times, March 2, 2006, p. 15.
27Aoki (1988), pp. 49-98.
17C. For a comparative analysis
It has been shown that a multidimensional “high-powered” incentives can be efﬁcient under
some conditions. Then why are similar organizations rare in the West? In the US, Ford style of
the “contractually ﬁxed wage” became dominant for blue-collar workers in the auto industry in
the 1920-30s, ironically when they discovered the concept of “hedonic prices” (Waugh (1928),
Court (1939)). European auto industries had followed suit by the 1970s. A reason why the ﬁxed
wage was taken there were with some combination of the new technology for mass production
and the new management afﬁliated with it. However, another point was that incentive wages
had to face union conﬂicts, and ﬁxed wages have been a part of agreements between ﬁrms and
unions in the Western manufacturing industries until now. In the auto industry, for instance,
while many Japanese practices were introduced in the 1990s, the industry’s standard pay struc-
ture based on an agreement between the Big Three and the UAW remained, and the Japanese
style of an individualized and “capability-based” wage systems have been rejected.28
The inertia of American industrial relations can be traced back to the very beginning of
industrialization in the US.29 Hence an important factor is probably the historical path of the
industrialization. The modern textile industry was a newly implemented industry in 19th cen-
tury Japan, and young female workers did not have a history of guilds. However, in the Western
world, especially male workers had a tradition of guild-like unions and sometimes they were
against ﬁrms that tried to control production.30 This seems to be a reason why multidimensional
incentives are not offered to blue-collar workers in the West but they are in Japan.
This difference could also be a part of explanation of why the Western manufacturing is
generally competitive in the production for the low-end or the high-end market, but not for the
middle-range market. Production of generic or luxury goods does not require or suit multidi-
mensional incentives. Instead, implicit incentives like guaranteed positions and career consid-
erations would be suitable to the production of luxury goods. On the other hand, consumers
of middle-range products can be recognized across standardized terms, hence multidimensional
incentives work well for production of middle-range differentiated products.
















Since the rank of ααT is 1, the solution Γ ∗
j of ΣT
j Γ T
j ααT + ααTΓ T
j ΣT
j = 0 is unique
only if each row of Γj contains only one nonzero entry. Such a Γ ∗
j minimizes αTΓjΣjΓjα
28J¨ urgens, Malsch and Dohse (2003), pp. 215-280. Wheeler (1993), pp. 71-75. Weinstein and Kochan (1995),
pp. 12-15. Adler, Kochan, MacDufﬁe, Pil and Rubinstein (1997), pp. 68-69. Sloane and Witney (2004), pp.
280-282. For an overview on the industrial relations in Japan after World War II, see Nakamura and Nitta (1995).
29Kochan and Katz (2000), pp. 17-48.
30Clark (1984).
18only if each row of Σj contains only one nonzero entry. Since each dimension of ǫj is positive,
itmeans Σj mustbediagonal, i.e., each dimensionofǫj mustbeindependent toeach other.
Proposition 2.
Proof. (a) By (7), if 0 < σ2
i < +∞, and if 0 < ς2
i < +∞, then 0 < γii < 1, so that information
both about the performance observed in the ﬁrm xi and the price observed in the market ˜ pi is
utilized to determine the wage w.
(b) For the observed performance in the ﬁrm x(t), as σ2
i → +∞, γii → 0, where information
only about the price ˜ pi is utilized. As σ2
i → 0, γii → 1, where information only about the
performance in the ﬁrm xi is utilized. For the price vector p(t), the proof is analogous.
Proposition 3.
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Historical document
“Kasaharagumi shiryo (Documents of Kasahara group),” held by Okaya Sanshi Hakubutsukan
(The Silk Museum of Okaya), Okaya, Nagano Prefecture, Japan.
22m
Table 1 Wage in the Kasahara Fusakichi Factory, Suwa County, Nagano Prefecture.
year Number  Distribution
of average maximu minimum median variance kurtosis skewness
samples
sen per sen per sen per sen per
workday workday workday workday
1897 138 18.067 32.042 7.413 17.997 29.547 0.003 0.362
1901 163 20.898 44.098 0.638 21.999 61.410 0.377 -0.034
1904 191 22.521 53.983 6.667 23.104 74.095 0.389 0.367
1905 199 20.040 46.415 3.625 20.652 60.918 0.088 0.268
1906 150 23.196 49.549 1.735 23.994 92.764 -0.341 0.034
1907 228 23.191 52.140 0.736 22.852 92.683 0.499 0.254
1908 251 22.931 59.780 1.774 24.001 99.890 0.178 0.309
1909 351 22.682 58.235 1.264 22.999 112.989 -0.229 0.405
1910 351 26.083 60.229 1.364 25.000 130.243 -0.258 0.247
1911 343 23.450 66.998 0.000 22.998 146.768 -0.001 0.405
1912 88 23.779 47.996 2.478 25.494 130.575 -1.062 -0.023
1913 83 23.209 60.000 3.080 20.000 159.526 0.011 0.794
Source: Fusakichi Kasahara, "Seishi keisan bo" (Book for evaluation of silk
reeling).  Kasaharagumishiryo (Documents of Kasahara goroup).
Notes: "Wage" does not contain supplemental payment, which amounts to 5-10%
of wage.  1 sen (0.01 yen) was approximately 0.5 cent of U.S. dollar.  The number
of samples is small in 1906, 1912, and 1913, because some books have been lost
for those years.  However, there is not any bias in distribution of performance
depending on each book, so that this loss does not affect the rsult of estimation.
23Table 2  Wage and observed performance
 w: Wage.  Į = (Į 1, Į 2, Į 3, Į 4): incentive vector. x = (x 1, x 2, x 3, x 4): signal of effort
vector t in the firm,  where x 1: Labor productivity. x 2: Material productivity.
x 3: Evenness of threads. x 4: Luster of threads. ȕ: transfer of surplus.
w = Į 1x 1 + Į 2x 2 + Į 3x 3 + Į 4x 4+ ȕ.
year Į 1 Į 2 Į 3 Į 4 ȕ standard R
2 p value
error for F
1897 0.777 0.209   0.000 0.031 0.681 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 (0.000)
1901 0.867 0.191   0.000 0.038 0.766 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 (0.000)
1904 0.838 0.190 0.042 0.093 0.000 0.038 0.809 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 0.209 0.005 (0.000)
1905 0.836 0.099 0.116 0.144 0.000 0.031 0.841 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 (0.000)
1906 0.799 0.150 0.052 0.164 0.000 0.044 0.803 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 0.173 0.000 (0.000)
1907 0.848 0.019 0.010 0.155 0.000 0.047 0.762 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.637 0.788 0.000 (0.208)
1908 0.794 0.143 0.114 -0.022 0.000 0.048 0.777 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.492 (0.000)
1909 0.860 0.073 0.173 0.016 0.000 0.037 0.883 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.436 (0.000)
1910 0.826 0.191 0.088 -0.046 0.000 0.049 0.821 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.075 (0.000)
1911 0.826 0.192 0.084 0.035 0.000 0.047 0.850 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.129 (0.000)
1912 0.754 0.176 -0.007 0.033 0.000 0.058 0.762 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.006 0.912 0.619 (0.002)
1913 0.780 0.202 0.030 0.079 0.000 0.051 0.846 0.000
p value for t 0.000 0.000 0.572 0.160 (0.000)
Source: Fusakichi Kasahara, "Seishi keisan bo."
Notes: Coeffecients are the results of a standadized linear regression so that the
transfer ȕ is normalized as 0.  The p value for t of ȕ is from an
unstandardized regression.  The number of  samples is the same as on Table 1.
24Table 3-a  Optimization of effort vector t (Labor
productivity-Material productivity  plane)
x 1: Labor productivity. x 2: Material productivity.
x 2 = Ș 1/x 1 + Ș 2.
year Ș 1 Ș 2 standard R
2 p value
error for F
1897 -0.116 0.000 0.404 0.013 0.177
p value for t 0.177 (0.000)
1901 0.035 0.000 0.467 0.001 0.661
p value for t 0.661 (0.000)
1904 -0.212 0.000 0.446 0.045 0.003
p value for t 0.003 (0.000)
1905 -0.299 0.000 0.403 0.089 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1906 -0.539 0.000 0.365 0.290 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1907 -0.713 0.000 0.700 0.509 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1908 -0.471 0.000 0.261 0.221 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1909 -0.468 0.000 0.257 0.219 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1910 -0.386 0.000 0.224 0.149 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1911 -0.359 0.000 0.270 0.129 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1912 -0.563 0.000 0.249 0.317 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1913 -0.338 0.000 0.400 0.114 0.002
p value for t 0.002 (0.000)
Source: Fusakichi Kasahara, "Seishi keisan bo."
Notes: Coefficients are the results of standardized linear
regression while the p value for t of Ș 2 is from an
unstandardized regression.  The  number of samples is
the same as on Table 1.
25Table 3-b  Optimization of effort vector t (Labor
productivity-Evenness of threads plane)
x 1: Labor productivity. x 3: Evenness of threads.
x 3 = Ș 1/x 1 + Ș 2.
Year Ș 1 Ș 2 standard R
2 p value
error for F
1904 -0.156 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.032
p value for t 0.032 (0.000)
1905 -0.383 0.000 0.000 0.147 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1906 -0.270 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.001
p value for t 0.001 (0.000)
1907 -0.589 0.000 0.000 0.347 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1908 -0.150 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.017
p value for t 0.017 (0.000)
1909 -0.216 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1910 -0.266 0.000 0.000 0.071 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1911 -0.132 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.015
p value for t 0.015 (0.000)
1912 -0.094 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.384
p value for t 0.384 (0.014)
1913 -0.071 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.523
p value for t 0.523 (0.207)
Source: Fusakichi Kasahara, "Seishi keisan bo."
Notes: Coefficients are the results of standardized linear
regression while the p value for t of Ș 2 is from an
unstandardized regression.  The number of samples is the 
same as on Table 1. 
26Table 3-c  Optimization of effort vector t (Labor
productivity-Luster of threads plane)
x 1: Labor productivity. x 4: Luster of threads.
x 4 = Ș 1/x 1 + Ș 2.
year Ș 1 Ș 2 standard R
2 p value
error for F
1904 -0.003 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.970
p value for t 0.970 (0.103)
1905 0.017 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.816
p value for t 0.816 (0.000)
1906 0.035 0.000 0.008 0.001 0.675
p value for t 0.675 (0.027)
1907 0.027 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.682
p value for t 0.682 (0.267)
1908 -0.154 0.000 0.014 0.024 0.015
p value for t 0.015 (0.174)
1909 -0.106 0.000 0.014 0.011 0.047
p value for t 0.047 (0.001)
1910 -0.339 0.000 0.012 0.115 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
1911 -0.214 0.000 0.014 0.046 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.852)
1912 -0.431 0.000 0.013 0.186 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.029)
1913 -0.492 0.000 0.010 0.242 0.000
p value for t 0.000 (0.000)
Source: Fusakichi Kasahara, "Seishi keisan bo."
Notes: Coefficients are the results of standardized linear
regression while the p value for t of Ș 2 is from an
unstandardized regression.   The number of sumples is the 
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Gaussian kernel, bindwidth 10.
Figure 1: Gaussian kernel regression (Labor productivity-Materialproductivity): Kasahara Fac-
tory, 1904.
Source: “Seishi keisan bo”.
Notes: Material productivity: produced raw silk per 4 shou (7,216 liters) of cocoon. Labor
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Unstandaridized estimated curve Observed
Unstandardized estimated curve: x 4 0.940x 10.009. R
2: 0.115. p value for F: 0.000.
p value for t     0.000       0.000
Figure 2: Optimization of effort vector t (Labor productivity-Luster of threads): Kasahara
Factory, 1910.
Source: “Seishi keisan bo”.
Notes: Luster of threads: points of Luster per 1 momme (3.75 grams) of raw silk. Labor
productivity: mommes of raw silk per workday.
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